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Since the early twentieth century, Kurds have challenged the borders and national identities of 
the states they inhabit. Nowhere is this more evident than in their promotion of the map of 
greater Kurdistan, a unified ideal homeland which encompasses large swathes of Turkey, Iraq, 
Syria and Iran, and a small part of Armenia, in a region with a complex history of ethnic, 
cultural and political background. The main Kurdish political actors in each of these states 
claim some ownership or control over a part of a state’s territory and they are usually careful 
to restrict their claims to within the state they reside. All these Kurdistans have been 
geographically, economically and culturally marginalised in each state and have historically 
been buffer zones between regional and colonial powers. The idea of greater Kurdistan 
combines these areas and puts Kurdistan at the centre rather than in the margins.  
 
The map of greater Kurdistan is embedded in the consciousness of the majority of Kurdish 
people, both within the region and, perhaps even more strongly, in the diaspora. The territory 
it depicts, Kurdistan, has never been a recognised state and does not have a unified political 
leadership. Yet the concept of Kurdistan, as a cultural and political abstract, survives the reality 
and exists in the minds of Kurdish nationalists, their supporters as well as those who deny it. 
The territory depicted on the map is a heterogenous geography inhabited by different ethnic 
and religious groups such as Arabs, Turks, Persians, Assyrians, Armenians, Yazidis, 
Christians, and others. The map projects a historical continuity of Kurdistan, overlooking 
historical conflicting claims, for instance between Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds. The Kurds 
do not constitute one group with a similar culture, language, religion and political goals. Tribal 
divisions are important, sometimes more so than Kurdishness. Kurdish political parties and 
Kurdish societies in each state face different problems that emerged as a result of distinct 
political, social, historical and economic circumstances of the state they are in. 
 
The map of greater Kurdistan is frequently used in Kurdish political programmes, on political 
party flags, on the walls of homes and offices, and its silhouette is even used on accessories 
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such as key rings, brooches, or necklaces. What is particularly noteworthy is that it is not only 
Kurdish nationalists who use this map, but also outsiders use it to show the location of the 
Kurdish homeland or to show the Kurdish demographic presence in the area. What is 
interesting is the almost identical cartographic depictions of maps showing Kurdish 
demography and maps showing the political aspiration of Kurdistan. Indeed, non-political 
maps that show the demographic distribution of the Kurds have similar contours in which the 
silhouette that emerges from coloured parts indicating Kurdish habitation looks very similar to 
the political map of Kurdistan. Although maps showing Kurdish habitation through the image 
of Kurdistan do not seek to make a political point on the existence of a Kurdish territory, the 
similarity of the contours of the demographic and political maps of Kurdistan is usually 
overlooked by outsiders using these maps.  
 
This raises two fundamental questions about the Kurdish political project, both of which have 
important implications for thinking about national self-determination and how this is pursued 
by non-state nationalists. Why and how has the map of greater Kurdistan become a widespread 
image; and what is the perceived underlying relationship between territory and people that 
bolsters the greater Kurdistan map? Widespread use of this map does not mean that all Kurds 
aim for a unified Kurdish statehood in the Middle East or those outsiders who use it support 
the idea of a unified Kurdistan. Many would claim the relationship is straightforward in that 
such a map merely depicts a people’s natural and actual homeland. For most Kurds, this is 
certainly the case. For its supporters, the map of greater Kurdistan makes the case that Kurds 
are a nation without a state whose homeland is divided by four states.  
 
Yet it is worth pushing beyond the question of the actuality or viability of a greater Kurdistan. 
The focus of this book is not to establish whether such a territory actually exists or not. Clearly 
imaginations of homelands are socially and politically constructed, rather than being natural 
and perennial, and the same can be said for state territories. The fact that states have 
internationally recognised boundaries does not make their territories less constructed or more 
natural. The aim of this book instead is to examine the imagination and presentation of the 
Kurdish homeland through its cartographic depictions within the contexts of internal Kurdish 
dynamics and the international normative framework since the nineteenth century. Through 
this, it seeks to examine the resultant political, cultural and social effects of this construction 
and historically trace how the Kurdistan map/s are constituted by Kurdish nationalist politics 
as well as international norms. 
 
Political maps have the power to influence our imaginations about where territories and states 
lie in the world because maps are seen as objective and scientific and they are powerful in 
making constructed ideas look natural (Agnew, Livingstone and Rogers 1996: 422). They are 
cultural and political discursive formations and represent perceptions, political discourses, 
ideologies and aspirations (Harley 1988, 1989, 1990; Crampton 2001). The narratives maps 
present create the lenses through which we see, understand and interpret territoriality, 
understood as the relationship between people and territory in this study. The power of maps 
derives from their embeddedness in the narratives of nation and identity. Conceptions of nation, 
identity and territoriality and how they define political realities and the rules of state legitimacy 
change over time. Their different meanings in different periods have implications for how we 
perceive political maps, both existing and aspirational. Kurds and outsiders imagine the 
Kurdish homeland through contemporary norms related to nation and territoriality, specifically 
self-determination. Fuzzy and changeable, this norm has influenced national politics, as well 
as the conception of Kurdistan and its map, in different ways over time.  
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The map of greater Kurdistan and the Kurds are an apt case to explore wider questions around 
maps, self-determination and territory. This map is a useful tool to navigate through a complex 
temporal and conceptual field in which ideas of self-determination and territoriality have 
changed and evolved, both in the case of Kurdish nationalism and internationally. Through this 
analysis, the book links politics around Kurdish nationalism to international-level politics and 
the international normative framework. The interaction of Kurdish nationalist groups, both in 
the region and in the diaspora, with international actors does not take place simply through the 
regional states they are located in. Their interactions with the international society of states, 
multilateral and international organisations and sub-state actors occur in a normative and 
political context that influences both states and non-state actors. 
 
This book contributes to the scholarly work on self-determination, nationalism and territoriality 
by integrating the Kurdish case into the debates on these phenomena. The Kurdish case is 
underrepresented in the discipline of International Relations (IR) and in the study of 
Nationalism despite its potential for generating new insights and lessons. The book approaches 
the study of Kurds in a way that has been neglected to date by offering a new perspective to 
the study of territoriality and presenting an in-depth historical case study from an IR 
perspective. It connects the evolution of Kurdish territoriality and Kurdish politics to the 
international level.   
 
The analysis developed in this book also contributes to the scholarly work on Kurdish politics. 
The existing work in this literature with an international angle examines the Kurds in each state 
and looks at how Kurdish politics influences the domestic, regional and international relations 
of these states (Voller 2014; Gunter 2011; Natali 2010, 2005; Barkey and Fuller 1998; Kirişçi 
and Winrow 1997). The literature also offers valuable analyses with different disciplinary 
perspectives, such as history, politics, sociology and anthropology.1 However, an IR analysis 
of Kurdish politics is missing in the literature. This book meets this gap and it looks at Kurdish 
politics in totality, rather than country-by-country and situates this case in an international 
context.  
 
Additionally, the book’s focus on Kurdish territoriality fills another gap in Kurdish studies. 
Even though territoriality is a significant feature of Kurdish nationalism and its politics, there 
is limited literature on territoriality, except social and political geographers O’Shea’s (2004) 
and Culcasi’s (2010, 2006) work that study Kurdistan from a political geography perspective. 
This book builds on O’Shea and Culcasi’s useful insights but situates the case in an 
international framework. O’Shea argued that the map of greater Kurdistan does not reflect the 
realities of Kurdish society or the region as a whole. She defined this map as a ‘propaganda 
map’ and saw it as a symbol of the effort to construct a Kurdish nationalist myth based on 
historical and territorial perceptions or imaginations (O’Shea 2004: 4). In her book, O’Shea 
examined the maps of Kurdistan and historical narratives about the origins of the Kurds as 
constructions created in order to produce a sense of unity in the minds of the people and to 
enable them to connect their identity to the territory they inhabit. Culcasi looked at the role 
orientalist discourses in the American journalistic geography of Kurdistan in presenting the 
Kurds in a way that supported and verified the United States’ geopolitical and ideological 
 
1 Literature on the Kurds with historical, political, sociological and anthropological perspectives has been growing 
since 2000s. Some examples are Stansfield and Shareef 2017; Eppel 2016; Galip 2015; Tezcür 2016; Allsopp 
2014; Bajalan 2013; Bengio 2014; King 2013; Entessar 2009; Lowe and Stansfield 2010; Olson 2009; Tejel 2008; 
Heper 2007; Tahiri 2007; Jabar and Dawod 2006; Jwaideh 2006; Romano 2006; O’Leary et.al 2005; Özoğlu 2004; 
Vali 2003.  
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position. Yet what is neglected is the international dimension and the international normative 
context in the construction of this map and how it is perceived. 
 
 
The Kurds and their territory 
 
One of the most common phrases that define the Kurds is ‘the largest nation without a state’2 
spread in a huge geography encompassing large swathes of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria and a 
small part of Armenia.3 Even if practical support and demand among the Kurds for a unified 
pan-Kurdistan is low, the idea that four states (five if Armenia is included) currently exist 
across what is ‘naturally’ Kurdish territory, has resonance in the minds of both Kurds and some 
outsiders as the continued and widespread use of the map of greater Kurdistan shows. The idea 
of territorial homeland played an important role in the emergence and development of Kurdish 
nationalism. Territorial identity is central to understanding Kurdish nationalist groups’ 
activities today. Despite this, the territorial aspect of Kurdish nationalism remains understudied 
and unproblematised in the academic literature. Existing studies depict the history of the region 
as the history of Kurdistan but fail to interrogate the basis and suppositions underpinning the 
assumption that a minority nationalism simply has a right to a territorial expression. In other 
words, most of these studies see the history of Kurdistan as identical to the history Kurdish 
nationalism (Hassanpour 2003), essentialising this territorial identity and underestimating the 
prevalence of political claims behind it.  
 
The concept of Kurdistan refers to a space, an area or a region, but in this book, this concept is 
used for ease of description. Space is ‘structural’ not territorial (Agnew 1994: 55, emphasis in 
the original). The territorial conception of space takes its representation for granted and this 
conception is quite dominant in the study of societies and politics. The structural conception 
of space, on the other hand, acknowledges its fluid and changing nature and its relationship 
with other social, economic and political factors (Agnew 1994: 55). The use of the concept of 
Kurdistan, therefore, does not imply that the region was historically defined as Kurdistan, or 
its inhabitants were all Kurdish, or the area had clearly demarcated borders/or its extent was 
clear. The concept of Kurdistan does not refer to ahistorical and ontologically permanent 
locations or territories but to the geographical context upon which social, economic and 
political interactions take place and in return, to a territory or geography shaped by these 
interactions (Agnew 1994: 56). 
 
Territory is usually understood to be obvious or self-evident (Elden 2010). Mainstream 
perspectives in IR usually does not define territory – instead they see it as state territory defined 
in terms of jurisdictional control over a physical area and the people living on it (Kadercan 
2015: 128). In this book, a political geography definition of territory is adopted, which connects 
territory directly to human agency and relations of power. In that sense, territoriality, the link 
between territory and society, is the primary concern here. The way Kurdistan and its map have 
been framed, used and interpreted throughout history have depended on how the relationship 
between nation and territory was understood in each period. The meaning and function of self-
determination, a key international norm related to the legitimacy of political authority in 
 
2 Despite the existence of possibly larger peoples without states such as the Tamils, an estimated population of 70 
million spread across Sri Lanka, Mauritius, India, Malaysia and Singapore.  
3 There is also a large Kurdish diaspora in Europe and the United States, and substantial and long-standing Kurdish 
communes in Central Anatolia in Turkey, Khorasan in Iran, in Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Georgia and 
Armenia as a result of imperial deployments and forced deportations, and migration to escape persecution or 
conflict. In Turkey, a large proportion of Kurds live in big cities such as Istanbul and Izmir. 
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international relations, had constitutive roles in shaping the relationship between the people 
and territory. In other words, the changes in the meaning and function of this international norm 
have, in turn, changed the way the relationship between a national people and ‘their’ territory 
– territoriality – is perceived.  
 
Kurdish nationalism asserts self-determination claims to territorial autonomy or independence 
based on a distinct cultural and ethnic identity. Kurdish activists, especially since the second 
part of the twentieth century, have disseminated the idea of Kurdistan to the international 
community through framing this promotion in the language of human rights, democracy and 
self-determination. This was done to enhance the legitimacy of their claims to democratic 
countries whose endorsement and support they seek. Kurds have been more successful than 
other smaller groups in the Middle East, such as the Assyrian Christians in Turkey, Syria and 
Iraq or the Turkmens and Yazidis in Iraq, in drawing attention to themselves and generating 
support and sympathy for the issues they have in each state and their desire to be recognised 
as a distinct people.  
 
Today, Kurds in Iraq enjoy official or de jure autonomy as a region in a federal Iraq. They have 
their own government, parliament, administration and military forces. Meanwhile although 
heavily suppressed in the past, since the onset of the war Kurds in Syria have carved a de facto 
autonomy in the north of the country, labelled as Rojava by the Kurds. In Turkey, the military 
conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) and the 
state army has been ongoing since 1984, interrupted by a short period of talks between 2012 
and 2015. The PKK gave up on its goal for independence since early 2000s and now seeks 
decentralisation within a system it calls ‘democratic confederalism’. In Iran Kurdish political 
activists are facing a struggle to survive under an oppressive regime but Kurds have historically 
benefited from some degree of cultural and linguistic rights in this country. Each of these 
groups faces different challenges, have different leaderships and pursue different goals. What 
is more, these goals and leaderships have often come into conflict within one another in the 
past and the war in Syria has exacerbated these divisions further in many key respects (Kaya 
and Whiting 2017). 
 
Given this picture, it is a fair statement to say that each Kurdish nationalist organisation 
typically defines its goals and problems in a way that is limited to the country they reside, with 
regional activities pursued especially by the PKK, but also by the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP)and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK in Iraq at a more limited level. No 
contemporary Kurdish nationalist party in the Middle East so far has made an explicit demand 
to establish a greater Kurdistan that would unite all the Kurds living in different states within 
a new single political entity and each Kurdish political movement has its own understanding 
of the boundaries of the territory they wish to have full or administrative control over. Despite 
this, the map of greater Kurdistan has gained resonance in both Kurdish and international 




The Map of Greater Kurdistan  
 
Kurds have been using the map of greater Kurdistan since the early twentieth century to depict 
the Kurdish homeland, much to the annoyance of the states in which they are located. Kurdish 
nationalists see the map of greater Kurdistan as the cartographical reflection of the Kurdish 
territory. Kurdistan as a homeland and its maps are commonly used in the rhetoric of almost 
 6 
all Kurdish nationalist organisations and activist groups, both in the region and in the diaspora. 
Kurdish nationalist historiography claims ownership of this territory since 4,000 BCE. Like 
other nationalisms it has a subjective view of national existence that goes back to ‘time 
immemorial’ and deploys past geographic and administrative terms to promote the idea that a 
Kurdish nation existed centuries ago (Izady 1992; Nezan 1996). In so doing, Kurdish 
nationalist historiography associates pre-modern meanings of ‘Kurdistan’ or ‘Kurdishness’ to 
the contemporary uses of national, territorial and political identity (O’Shea 2004: 2-3; 
McDowall 1996: 3).  
 
Kurdish activists have produced many historical, sociological and political texts to legitimise 
and prove the Kurdish right to statehood and have created and distributed multiple maps of 
Kurdistan. Maps are useful tools for presenting nationalist views. The cartographic image of a 
territory with clear boundaries and a name that makes reference to a people gives the message 
that the territory and the people inhabiting it are related. In fact, this usage has moved beyond 
the discourse of Kurdish nationalists. For example, Bob Filner, Democrat Congressman for 
California’s 51st District pleaded for the recognition of Kurdish self-determination at the 
United States Congress on 1 May 1997. The justification he put forth was that Kurds have been 
ruling the area they inhabit since 2,000 BCE and the Kurds (then Gutis) ruled today’s Persia 
and Mesopotamia 4,000 years ago. He declared that despite this historical legacy, Kurds have 
been denied the right to nationhood and self-determination. Frank Pallone, Congressman for 
the 6th district of New Jersey, in a speech also on 1 May 1997 appealed for Kurdish self-
determination and requested the United States government stop giving Turkey military support 
and making arms deals with it. Pallone gave another statement to the Congress 6 April 2000, 
referring to his 1997 address and referring to the ‘lands of Kurdistan’ and calling for support 
for action to stop the persecution of Kurds and violation of their rights in the hands of their 
states. 
 
The map of greater Kurdistan has become one of the prominent features and symbols of Kurds. 
It has become synonymous with the idea of ‘Kurdistan’ in the minds of the Kurds and become 
a significant feature of Kurdish nationalist discourse. Kurdish parties do not promote this map 
or include it as a territorial goal in their party programmes, but they use this map to justify the 
ethnic presence of Kurds on the territory the map depicts. There is a striking similarity between 
Kurdish nationalists’ and outsiders’ descriptions of Kurdistan. The idea that there is a direct 
link between the area represented on these maps and the people living in that area has become 
embedded in both Kurdish and international political discourses. As it has come to be seen as 
a natural territory, it has come to “inscribe boundaries and construct objects that in turn become 
our realities” (Pickles 2004: 145). 
 
 
The power of political maps and territoriality 
 
The power of political maps partly comes from their perceived objectivity and naturalness. We 
see the world through maps. The world, from a traditional IR perspective is composed of state 
territories that frame the nation and the space it controls. The world political map reifies the 
idea of a world divided into sovereign domestic spaces of control and political authority (Black 
2000: 12). Political maps are widely used in state offices, schools, newspapers and other forms 
of media, internet, flags, political pamphlets, which in turn further perpetuate our image of the 
world (Vujakovic 2002: 377-79). In this process, particular understandings of politics, society 
or the world a map depicts become common sense, as if the map reflects reality in a neutral 
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and transparent way (Weldes 1996: 303). Because of the perception that maps are scientific, 
the sense of territorial control and the boundaries of states appear both objective and natural.  
 
Critical geographers challenged the idea that maps reflect objective cartographic information 
(Black 2000; Crampton 2001; Pickles 2004). They argued that the mapping process produces 
the territory and the identity of the people that live in that territory. Maps, including state maps, 
are social and political constructs shaped and understood through temporal, social and political 
contexts and discourses (Crampton and Krygier 2006: 15-17). Social constructions are things 
we consider as common sense because they appear to reflect reality, like gender roles or 
identity. Societies usually take social constructions for granted, as something natural, and 
hardly question their origins (Weldes 1996: 279-80). In the case of maps, those who are inside 
the boundaries of a map are considered to share an identity, different from those who are 
outside those borders (Anderson 1991), overlooking the fact that historically boundaries 
change, and do so more often than assumed.   
 
The power of political maps also derives from the discourse through which we see cartographic 
images. There is interplay between the map and our knowledge of shared ideas and dominant 
discourse (Weldes 1996: 286). The overlap between dominant narratives of national identity 
and territoriality, in other words the idea that the world is composed of nations and their 
territories, is at the source of the power of political maps. Conceptions of nation and homeland 
constitute the context through which we understand maps. These conceptions are underpinned 
by notions of nationhood and territoriality, which change over time and in turn shapes the way 
we perceive cartographic information.  
 
Our conceptions of national identity and territoriality not only shape how we see the maps of 
states but also maps of aspirational territories, claimed homelands of aspirant nations. The 
contemporary international system builds on territorially defined as national units and nation-
states represented on the world map, which are perceived to have internationally recognised 
sovereignty (Krasner 1999: 9-25). Separatist nationalists use the same logic; they use maps of 
their imagined homeland to show their location in the world and imply that they deserve 
sovereignty over their territory in the same way that other recognised sovereign entities have. 
In that sense, cartographic images can become political tools not only for recognised states but 
also for those who seek recognition, such as separatist and autonomist nationalists. Maps 
become tools for showing competing understandings of territorial reality on the same land 
(Culcasi 2006: 681), making maps divisive.  
 
Separatist and autonomist nationalists aim to achieve autonomy or devolved authority within 
the state or to form their own state on behalf of their nation on the territory over which they 
claim ownership (Breuilly 2001: 32). In that sense, when demanding self-determination, they 
claim their own territoriality and sovereignty and challenge the sovereignty of the ruling state 
(Mayall 1990: 51, 69). Here the tension is between a people’s right to self-determination and 
another people’s right to existing sovereignty (Bishai 2004: 7), in other words, between two 
different claims on territoriality.  
 
By definition, the democratic enterprise is based on a defined group of people, and for the last 
couple of centuries this group is understood to be the nation. Popular sovereignty, a product of 
the French and American democratic revolutions, moulded into the nineteenth-century concept 
of nationalism in the transition from the sovereignty of monarchs to that of the peoples. 
Throughout the transformation of the doctrine of sovereignty in the nineteenth century, 
different types of sovereignties co-existed (Benton 2010: 1-2). But by early twentieth century, 
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people and popular sovereignty became the legitimate source of a state’s sovereignty and 
absolute control within its territory in most parts of the world (Philpott 2001: 16; James 1999: 
458-59; Krasner 2001). 
 
With the devolution of states and empires into nation-states, the idea of popular sovereignty 
became associated with nationality, consent of the governed, and later, self-determination. 
People, or the nation, emerged as the source of state power, and state territoriality became 
defined as linked to the nation. The 1789 Declaration of Rights of Man and of Citizen by the 
National Assembly of France defines nation as “essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor 
can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly 
derived from it.” The association of sovereignty with a specific group of people, the nation, 
brought with it challenges to existing sovereignties, in the form of self-determination demands.  
 
The principle of self-determination is a critically important principle. It is part of the rules and 
principles that bind or guide state relations. It has a geographical aspect because it involves 
people and territoriality. It pertains to processes both within the states and at international level 
(Knight 1985: 251). On one hand it stresses continuity of the territorial integrity of each state 
or, for instance, territorial administrations, but it also challenges the status quo, because 
according to United Nations (UN) documents, it is the right of all peoples. Self-determination, 
the right of peoples to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development”, as defined in the Article 1 of the UN International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, has had a determining role in the proliferation of nation-states in 
the twentieth century.  
 
Demand for secessionist self-determination, or the “desire of minority nations to demand 
sovereignty” in the form of administrative regions or independence, increased dramatically in 
the post-1918, post-1945 and post-1991 periods (R. Griffiths 2014: 580). The number of states 
in the world in 1912 was 51; as of May 2018, this number was 195, according to the United 
States Department of State.4 Woodrow Wilson’s, then President of the United States, ideal of 
self-determination, which he introduced as a pathway to statehood for small nations in the 
aftermath of the First World War, turned into an international framework for forming new 
states out of existing ones (Moynihan 2002; Moore 2014, 2015; Miller 2014). Enshrined as an 
international legal norm in the UN Charter of 1945, the principle was implemented in ex-
colonial territories in the 1950-70s, and subsequently in ex-communist territories after 1991. 
Today some consider self-determination as applicable to certain territories that are neither ex-
colonial nor ex-communist (Fabry 2010: 180). With the 1990s, the pressure to prioritise people 
over territory increased again with the return to Wilsonian self-determination. Although this 
last trend has not gained much legitimacy and traction globally, instances of people demanding 
self-determination, unilaterally declaring it (Kosovo in 2008) or gaining autonomous self-rule 
(Kurdistan Region of Iraq) have certainly increased. Within this context, the territory-nation 
link turned into something perennial for nationalists and their supporters, even if it challenges 
existing state territories.  
 
Claims for self-determination actually are made to advance the sovereignty and territoriality of 
a new people in the form of independence or autonomy. Such claims assume the existence of 
a clearly definable territory that belongs to a people, or the possibility of drawing clear 
boundaries for such a territory, despite the fact that it is hard to define ‘people’, let alone where 




other states, or in Krasner’s words ‘international legal sovereignty’, is necessary. International 
legal sovereignty is recognition of a state’s rule over a specific territory and people by other 
states (Krasner 1999: 14-20).5 Then the issue is with deciding which people a state is entitled 
to wield legitimate authority over.  
 
Self-determination reifies territoriality – the assumed link between the territory and the people. 
After all, the “purpose and value of the division of the world into territorial jurisdictions is self-
determination” (Banai et al. 2014: 103). Self-determination provides the pretext for 
assumptions on the nation-territory link, whether this link is understood in the context of a 
traditional state model or in relation to more plural forms of governance or separatists’ 
demands. In all these cases, a link is assumed to exist between territory and people. This is 
despite the fact that assuming any such link can be problematic due to the obvious question of 
defining who the people are, the existence of multiple cultural groups on a piece of land, and 
the normative and subjective questions around who has territorial rights.  
 
 
The link between nation and territory 
 
Interrogating the link between the nation and territory is necessary for generating a nuanced 
understanding of self-determination in separatist cases. Assumptions on an intrinsic link 
between the nation and territory actually hinder theoretical discussions on self-determination 
and on the implications of separatism or autonomism. Therefore, an empirically grounded 
theoretical interrogation of the link between nation and territory sheds a new light on debates 
around self-determination and claims to sovereignty. 
 
Separatist or autonomist nationalists perceive their national boundaries as different from the 
existing boundaries of the country they inhabit. Their claims emphasise that the people who 
are attached to a territory should have the right to exercise sovereignty over it. Most separatists 
bolster this claim with an assertion that they have distinct cultural, territorial and linguistic 
identities, arguing that the only way to protect their identity is through the democratic right to 
sovereignty over a specific territory. The right emerges from the process in which people’s 
usage and habitation of a specific territory generates, or is believed to generate, a territorially 
defined identity. Territory, from this perspective, is seen as a material necessity to enforce laws 
and policies through which the national or cultural identity of people can be protected (White 
2000: 22; Kacowicz 1994: 7), basically echoing the idea that “the political and the national 
should be congruent” (Gellner 2006: 6).  
 
How can we explain this assumption that group identity and territory are linked? Why are 
ethno-national separatist movements associated with territory, or why is the right to self-
determination usually framed around territorial identity? The existing literature in IR on self-
determination provides useful explanatory and normative insights to some other relevant 
questions but has not necessarily interrogated how the link between territory and group identity 
came to be taken for granted. These scholars emphasise the resonance of self-determination, 
the rightfulness of such claims and the conditions under which such claims are given 
international recognition (Buchanan 2003; M. Griffiths 2003; Castellino 2000; Heraclides 
1997; Shaw 1997). Others focus on the liberal and democratic underpinnings of self-
determination demands, and solutions for territorial disputes (Tamir 2003; Moore 1997; 
 
5 Krasner defines different types of sovereignty – a complex concept with multiple and changing meanings 
throughout the history – ‘domestic sovereignty’, ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ ‘interdependence sovereignty’ 
(Krasner 1999: 9-25). 
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Horowitz 1994), or the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality and self-determination 
(R. Griffiths 2014; Fabry 2010; James 1999; Mayall 1990).  
 
There is also a more recent body work that tries to develop a theory of territory and to 
understand what constitutes attachment between people and territory and what justifies the 
territorial rights of states and non-state groups (Banai, 2014; Miller, 2014, 2012; Moore, 2014; 
Elden, 2013). This work builds on previous attempts by political geographers to theorise 
territory (Anderson, 1998; Agnew, 1994; Knight 1985), and this is a useful starting point to 
interrogate the assumption between territory and nation. Moore (2014) offers a theoretical 
perspective to territory and explains the different perspectives of the ‘nationalist theory’ and 
‘legitimate state theory’ on territory. Nationalist theory of territory argues, according to Moore, 
that nations are perennial entities that have existed throughout history and therefore should be 
the foundational units in the organisation of the world. As such, the nation-state system is 
defensible. Although this theory does not claim to offer answers to all territorial disputes or to 
provide justification for all territorial claims, it asserts that a state can claim territorial rights 
only if it represents a people, a nation, understood as culturally integrated and continuous over 
time. According to this approach, basically, nations’ ownership of territory comes from the 
material and symbolic value they add to the land (Miller 2011: 107); nation and territory are 
attached because they shape each other and people mix their culture with territory by creating 
cultural and political rules and institutional structures on that territory (Moore 2014: 124). 
 
The assumptions about the link between nation and territory in the nationalist theory, as 
described by Moore, have resonance in the ethno-symbolist and primordial accounts of the 
concept of nation in the study of Nationalism. These accounts argue that the core of nations 
existed in the past before the division of the world into nation-states. Smith, whose definitions 
and theories have had a huge influence on contemporary work on nationalism, called this an 
ethnie, the pre-modern basis of nations, and emphasised territorial attachment as one of the 
significant characteristics of ethnies (Smith 1986). Although Smith distanced himself from 
less-respected primordialist accounts of nationalism, his concept of ethnie as the precursor of 
nationalism gave resonance to nationalist ideals about national awakening. Both separatist and 
state nationalists make reference to the historical existence of their distinct ethnic identity and 
territorial ownership, and both invoke democratic rights for their people. For these accounts, 
Smith’s approach has a huge appeal, including Kurdish nationalists and parts of the Kurdish 
nationalist scholarship. As Alexander and Smith put it, “Smith’s approach to nationalism 
satisfies the emotional gap that primordialism’s collapse left behind” (Alexander and Smith 
2015: 784). Though they also emphasise that Kurdish experts have overlooked the finer details 
of Smith’s thinking about how complex phenomena ethnie and nation are, and instead but 
focused on the “idea of the transition ethnie ® nation.” (Alexander and Smith 2015: 774). 
 
Scholars who adopt the ethno-symbolist perspective see territorial control and jurisdiction as a 
material necessity for the protection of the national and cultural identities of peoples (White 
2000: 22). It is essential, for them, that new governing institutions represent the ethnic and 
cultural identity of the people (Kacowicz 1994: 7). Smith argued that ‘ethnospaces’, defined as 
sacred sites, mountains, battlefields, tombs and monuments, are significant in the construction 
of national identities or in the ‘territorialisation of memory’ (1996: 454). He accepted that 
territorial identity is socially constructed and that it is humans who give meaning to that 
territory. But he also argued that territorial associations asserted by nationalists should have 
implications on the political life of their people on whose behalf they talk. According to Smith, 
this is not particularly destabilising. On the contrary, what provokes instability is the failure to 
implement the national ideal (Smith 1981: 199). Ethno-symbolist (and primordialist) 
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arguments draw on the idea that a homeland is one of the key traits of ethnic or national groups. 
Most separatist nationalists aspiring to have their own sovereignty, use the idea of an ethnically 
defined territory as the content and justification for their aspirations. Territory and its history 
are central for ethno-nationalist groups and they believe that their objectively perceived 
territorial identity gives them the right to exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over that 
territory (Buchanan 2003). 
 
The other theory Moore describes, the legitimate state theory, adopts a different view on the 
territory and nation link, or territoriality. Legitimate state theory argues that people or non-state 
communities alone cannot be right holders over territory. The state and people living on its 
territory are the legitimate right-holders of land (Stilz 2011), and the state and its institutions 
generate a collective body of people, the nation. So here, the link between territory and people 
is established via a legitimate state, and is not assumed to exist already and naturally. Only 
nations with a legitimate state can claim ownership over a territory. National culture is also 
important for legitimate state theory in that nation and territory ultimately become connected, 
but the crucial distinction from nationalist theories is that the key justification for people’s 
ownership of the territory is the legitimate jurisdiction of the state. This view echoes the 
modernist accounts of nations, which emphasise the constructed nature of nations and national 
identities – constructed through historical processes of state formation, capitalism, print-
capitalism and the transition from monarchical systems to republican and democratic states 
(Gellner 2006; Breuilly 1993; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). However, the 
legitimate state theory remains limited in accounting for non-state nationalist claims and offers 
a statist perspective in which states could also be the representative of a majority identity at the 
expense of others.  
 
The division between nationalist and legitimate state theories builds on the widely used civic-
ethnic typology in the study of Nationalism. The civic type has more in common with the 
legitimate state theory while the ethnic type corresponds more to nationalist theory. The civic 
understanding of nations (also known as solidarist or political) emphasises citizenship, while 
the ethnic understanding (also known as cultural) emphasises the common ‘objective’ traits of 
a group of people (Kohn 1929; Calhoun 2007). Although this ideal typology does not always 
apply to real cases and many cases incorporate elements from both types (Zimmer 2003: 177-
181), it provides a conceptual frame for understanding claims made on behalf of a nation. The 
civic type is generally associated with the individual choice to be part of a nation and the 
significance of state institutions and political culture in constructing collective identity. The 
ethnic type on the other hand is associated with a belief in the perennial existence of a distinct 
group. It assumes the objective national or ethnic features of a group to be given and continuous 
throughout history.  
 
Crucially, despite different emphasises between the nationalist and legitimate state theories, 
what they both have in common is that neither actually questions the assumption that nation 
and territory are linked. They disagree on the processes that creates the connection between 
nation and territory, but both consider the nation-territory attachment, or territoriality, as an 
existing core feature of a people. Similarly, although the two approaches differ in how they 
justify the territorial rights of people, again they both fail to interrogate this link. Instead they 
assume a territory-people link exists in theory and in practice. When assessing whether this 
attachment can be turned into a right to ownership for non-state peoples, they try to verify the 
existence of that attachment in empirical terms. As such, neither approach asks the bigger 
question of whether such attachments, whether in the case of states or non-states, should be 
accepted in either theoretical, conceptual or practical terms in the first place.  
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Again, the point here is not to discuss whether a link between territory and people actually 
exists or not. The question is why such a link is perceived to exist and how the perceived nature 
of this link changes over time and influences territorial politics of non-state nationalist actors. 
Assumptions embedded in the discourse and narrative on nations and territoriality shape how 
we see the world map or the cartographic depictions of aspirational homelands. These 
assumptions are two-fold as explained so far. One is the belief in the objectivity and accuracy 
of maps, which lends political power to these tools of communication. Second, and most 
important, the international normative and political context that shapes these perceptions have 
changed historically. International narratives of self-determination and territoriality, and their 
new meanings in different periods affected the way both Kurds and outsiders perceived the 
Kurdistan maps and Kurdish territoriality. The rest of this book explores the changing 
dynamics between international justifications for people’s claims to territorial self-





The map of greater Kurdistan conveys the message that the territory it demarcates belongs to 
the Kurds. Its influence comes from the assumed natural link between ‘nation’ and ‘territory’. 
Though, it is more likely to be politically constructed because we see the world map through 
our assumptions about nation, territory and territoriality. Political maps have the power to 
shape people’s images of the world in a manner that text alone fails to. They are visual 
expressions of apparently homogenous national territories. In reality, political maps are not 
simply reflections of how the world territory is partitioned; they are the outcomes of political 
projects and imaginations, and in return, they shape our perceptions of the world territory.  
 
The argument the map of greater Kurdistan makes – that the boundaries depicted on the map 
reflect a Kurdish territory – is a political and subjective argument. Nonetheless, the widespread 
use and reproduction of the map bolsters the Kurdish struggle to generate support for their 
cause and raise awareness about their issues. This raises key questions relating to: how has the 
map of Kurdistan become a widespread symbol of Kurdish territorial identity; where does the 
idea of the map of Kurdistan come from; what messages does this map give; how is it 
perceived, and why; and has its purpose, use and reception changed over time?  
 
The map of greater Kurdistan has been developed and communicated through the use of 
dominant international norms that give legitimacy to nationalist demands. The key 
international norm that shapes the rules of legitimacy on territorial and national rights is self-
determination. This principle and related concepts such as sovereignty and territoriality 
influence the meaning of ‘nation’ and ‘territory’, and the relationship between them. Shifts in 
its meaning and in their relationship shape how maps are perceived.  
 
The rest of the book historically traces the changes in the meaning of self-determination and in 
its relationship with territoriality and explains how these changes affected the use and reception 
of the map of Kurdistan by the Kurds and outsiders in different historical periods. Over time, 
self-determination expanded from being applicable to nations (initially understood as peoples 
of states) to include peoples with distinct ethnic, linguistic and territorial characteristics. This 
transformation increased the traction the map of greater Kurdistan has in international society. 
The book tells the parallel and interlinked stories of the map of greater Kurdistan and self-
determination since the late nineteenth century until today. It argues that in its transformation, 
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the idea of Kurdistan and its map have been a constant term of reference for Kurdish 
nationalism. But, the framing, use and interpretation of both self-determination and the idea of 
Kurdistan have depended on how the relationship between nation and territory was understood 
in each period.  
 
What follows now, in the second chapter ‘Kurdish territoriality under Ottoman rule’, is the 
analysis of the conceptual and historical underpinnings of the idea of Kurdistan and its later 
cartographic manifestations. This chapter explains the attribution of modern meanings of 
territory and nation to the past references of Kurdistan in the Kurdish nationalist historiography 
and examines the territoriality of the tribal leaders who revolted against the Ottomans in the 
nineteenth century. Third chapter, ‘Orientalist views of national identity and colonial maps of 
Kurdistan’ focuses on the maps of Kurdistan produced in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries by Western travellers and colonial officers. Colonialist understanding of what 
constitutes national identity shaped the way territorial identity of the peoples of this region. 
This perception shaped the construction of a retrospective view on Kurdish national identity 
later in the twentieth century. The maps European travellers produced were later adopted and 
used by Kurdish nationalists and became the key sources of mapping the Kurdish nation.  
 
The fourth chapter, ‘Wilsonian self-determination: The rise and fall of hopes for Kurdistan’, is 
about how Kurdish nationalism adapted to the international framing for legitimate statehood in 
the first half of the twentieth century. This period was the height of Kurdish hopes for 
statehood, which did not come to fruition. Kurdish political elite presented their Kurdistan 
maps to international authorities to receive support for their project, similar to many other 
groups across the world in this period. The fifth chapter, ‘Kurdish nationalism during 
decolonisation and the Cold War’, is about another significant period of state formation 
worldwide, when Kurdish nationalism transformed from being an elite project to a grassroots 
movement and different movements emerged in the four countries Kurds reside.  
 
The sixth chapter, ‘Kurds and the international society after the Cold War’, looks at the 
evolution of self-determination and new state formation process in the post-Cold War period 
and the international norms of democracy and human rights that framed and shaped the goals 
of each Kurdish nationalist group. The seventh chapter, ‘Kurdish diaspora: Kurdistan map goes 
global’ looks at the role of Kurdish activists in the diaspora in making the map of greater 
Kurdistan a widely used symbol of Kurdish territoriality. The Kurdish diaspora combined the 
prevalent normative and political discourse of human rights, justice and democracy with their 
identity-based territoriality and promoted pan-Kurdish ideas more strongly than the Kurds in 
the region. The concluding chapter offers a re-cap of the historical case study of the map of 
Kurdistan and its alignment with the evolution of the international normative framework, 
specifically self-determination, and looks at the situation of Kurdish politics today and the 
divisive impact of the war in Syria on the Kurds. 
 
 
